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Introduction
During the 1990s, as the scientific community, national governments and international organisations began to negotiate their way through the set of debates that would become known as 'climate change', municipal authorities in Europe and North America also began to mobilise around these issues. In our 2005 paper, Rethinking sustainable cities: multilevel governance and the 'urban' politics of climate change, we reflected on this first wave of municipal responses and made a case for the increasing significance of climate change in the urban politics of sustainability. As part of this special issue celebrating the contributions that Environmental Politics has made over its twenty-one year history, we revisit this article and consider its salience in a world of urban climate governance that has changed rapidly in the intervening years. Far from being a little known concern amongst a minority of municipalities, the city now looms large on the international climate change agenda. For example, in 2010, the World Bank, for some a bastion of nation-state-focused development, declared that climate change was an 'urgent agenda' for the world's cities (World Bank 2010a). The significant contribution to overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions due to continued lock-in of urban development to high-carbon development paths together with the potential vulnerability of cities to the impacts of climate change has served over the past decade to bring the issue of how cities should and could respond to climate change to the forefront of many global organisations and has provoked renewed efforts at the urban scale to address these challenges.
Revisiting our analysis of the urban politics of climate change, we first summarise the main points of our previous argument, which was based on the analysis of urban responses to climate change in the UK, US and Australia (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003) , and focused on case studies of climate change and planning in the UK. We find that while some of the arguments retain their validity, a great deal has changed in the urban climate change landscape and thus there is much to reconsider. In this light, we examine in the rest of the paper the ways in which new developments such as the expansion of urban climate responses to a broader range of cities and a more strategic approach to municipal climate action challenge our original analysis and the multilevel governance perspective on which it was based. We conclude by considering the implications for the development of theory and practice in this field.
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Reconsidering sustainable cities and the multilevel politics of climate change
Our analysis of the emergence of climate change on urban research and policy agendas during the 1990s and early 2000s started from a curious paradox. While the discourse of sustainable cities had provoked significant interest in how cities might be implicated in, and respond to, global environmental issues, much of the analysis of how this took place was grounded in what Marvin and Guy (1997, p. 312) refer to as a 'new localism', a framework within which the 'locale is seen as a socio-spatial container in which the sum of institutional, social and physical relations necessary to achieve a more sustainable future can be found'.
This framing, we argued, was limiting our understanding of the ways in which wider social, economic and political processes serve to configure the possibilities of urban sustainability in general, and of climate change responses in particular. Seeking to 'step beyond the local as a frame of reference' (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p . 48), we proposed that perspectives being developed to understand processes of 'multilevel governance' could provide a useful means through which to understand 'why moves towards urban sustainability are, and are not, taking place' (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 48) . As originally developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001) multilevel governance is seen as comprising two, related, sets of processes: Type I which involves the negotiation of authority and competencies between different levels of government; and Type II, where multiple overlapping and interconnected horizontal spheres of authority are involved in governing particular issues. Such an approach, we suggested, held out the promise of being able to take into account the multiple sites and processes through which urban responses to climate change were configured and contested.
We focused on two cases in the UK: urban planning in Newcastle and transport planning in Cambridgeshire. In both cases we found that while issues of local institutional capacity and political conflicts were important in shaping the gap between the growing rhetoric of the need for sustainability and urban development realities, the most significant dynamics exceeded any purely local framing. We suggested, instead, that a multilevel governance approach could provide insights into the two key factors which determined the ways in which the rhetoric of climate protection was interpreted and implemented -the powers and competencies of local government, and the discursive struggles through which urban problems were defined. The Type I perspective helped us to analyse how, why, and with what effect, competencies for governing climate change were shared between different hierarchical levels of government, as well as to the disjuncture between the formal attribution of competency (e.g. to local authorities for the implementation of hard 'demand management' measures in transport planning) and the de facto sense of what it was, and was not, possible H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 3 to do at a local level (where, in Cambridgeshire, managing demand was regarded as a challenge that could not be undertaken in the context of continued economic growth). Our analysis found that it was the ways in which urban development and transport planning were framed and defined that was critical in determining how climate change was taken into account. Here, we found that 'these discourses were constructed through coalitions of actors and institutions which stretch over multiple sites and scales' (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, p. 57), including local authorities, dominant local business interests, labour unions, national policy-makers, and transnational corporations. In both cases, we found that these 'spheres of authority', which were constituted through sets of social, economic and political relations that cut across scales, served to sideline issues of climate protection and urban sustainability.
This analysis led to two important conclusions. First, that the governing of climate change is not confined to arenas of international negotiation or national policy making, but is also a critical urban issue. Second, that the 'geographical imaginary' of environmental politics, where discrete local, national and international arenas operated in parallel, needed to give way to an account which recognised the complex vertical linkages between state institutions and the emergence of new political spaces which exceed this lexicon (see also Adger et al. 2003 , Bulkeley 2005 . Reflecting on our analysis and these conclusions after a decade of subsequent research in the field gives us the opportunity to consider their validity in the light of the rapidly changing landscape of urban responses to climate change. Here, we focus on three particular facets of the argument. First, we discuss the ways in which the urban climate change agenda has evolved over the past two decades and the consequent implications for how we should engage with the urban politics of climate change. Our paper was based on research which predominantly took place during the late 1990s, and the world of urban climate responses has shifted significantly since that time in ways that raise important challenges for our analysis. Second, we reconsider the utility of multilevel governance perspectives for understanding urban climate change responses. Reviewing different ways in which the concept has been deployed, we examine its shortcomings and future potential. Third, we consider the extent to which we can identify a 'new' politics of urban climate change governance and its consequent implications for the development of theory and practice in this field.
The rise and rise of the urban climate change agenda
Given the current ubiquity of narratives concerning climate change, whether that be with respect to vulnerability and resilience, or to forms of low carbon development and transition, H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 4 within urban arenas it is hard to imagine that just a short decade ago such agendas were far from common place. Although the rhetoric of sustainable development had taken hold on urban agendas in some cities by the late 1990s, few engaged with the more abstract issue of climate change. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the dynamics of the urban response to climate change can be considered in two phases. The first phase, which can be termed one of municipal voluntarism (Bulkeley 2013) , involved predominately small and medium sized cities in North America and Europe and was characterised by individuals within municipal authorities recognising the potential significance of climate change and offering some form of response. The transnational municipal networks which dominated activity during this time -ICLEI's Cities for Climate Protection programme, the Climate Alliance and Energie-cities (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, Kern and Bulkeley 2009 ) --were in this sense reminiscent of social movements with their focus on gathering intentions, knowledge and purpose towards common goals. Further, in seeking to respond to climate change, these networks and those pioneering cities with the resources and political will to do so sought to develop tactics that were based on an integrated, evidence-based, approach to climate planning and policy, and coincident with the broader direction of local governance within which accounting for performance was ever more important (Pierre and Peters 2000) .
The number of cities engaged with climate change grew through the 1990s and participation expanded to Asia, Australia, and Latin America. Reported actions were primarily focused on the reduction of GHG emissions from within municipal operations -a 'self-governing' approach (Bulkeley and Kern 2006) , albeit one that has led to new mechanisms for financing projects, accounting for carbon, the deployment of novel technologies, and a growing political awareness about the issue of climate change (Allman et al. 2004 , Betsill and Bulkeley 2007 , Kousky and Schneider 2003 , Schreurs 2008 .
In seeking to roll-out comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change across urban communities, municipal governments sought to 're-frame' climate change as an issue through which other significant local agendas -air pollution, health, congestion, energy security and so on -might be addressed (Betsill 2001) . Where action was forthcoming, lacking the political will and competencies to introduce new forms of regulation and having a minimal role in how critical infrastructure systems and utility services were provided, in the main, municipal governments sought to develop an enabling mode of governing through which business and communities were encouraged to act in, and on behalf of, the city (Bulkeley and Kern 2006) . Taken together, the challenges of institutional capacity and of political economy that were encountered as authorities sought to engage in responding to H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 5 climate change beyond their own operations led to a more piecemeal and opportunistic approach than originally envisaged. While some cities were able to develop sufficient capacity and political will to overcome such barriers and to draw others together to sustain a programmatic approach to climate change in the city, many witnessed a growing gap between the rhetoric of a need for an urgent response and the realities of governing climate change on the ground. Network, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, has been established precisely to promote urban responses to climate change which focus on this issue (Satterthwaite et al. 2008 , Anguelovski and Carmin 2011 , Solecki et al. 2011 .
The types of cities and responses to climate change that now characterise the urban climate governance landscape is therefore markedly different from those upon which our analysis was based in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In keeping with the municipal voluntarism that characterised the period of our analysis, we focused on the ways in which municipal authorities were seeking to use existing policy and planning processes to respond to climate change, and the emerging conflicts between environmental and economic interests that this provoked. As responding to climate change has in some cities become both a more strategic concern within urban authorities, and a more mainstream economic issue, the extent to which political conflicts would now be manifest in this way is open for debate, an issue to which we turn in more detail below. In addition, it raises fundamental issues about what H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 7 might be constituted as 'urban' environmental governance. For example, critical in reshaping this landscape has been the rise of carbon markets and carbon finance. For some cities, carbon markets are seen as a means of securing resources and advancing their local agendas and they are engaging in markets in many different ways (Betsill and Rabe 2009, While et al. 2010) . In mandatory emissions trading markets such as the EU ETS and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US, regulated entities are often located in urban sites providing the opportunity to finance local emissions reductions through the sale of permits. A number of municipalities were members of the Chicago Climate Exchange, a voluntary but legally binding emissions trading system which was in operation from 2000-2010. For some, the incentive was to gain experience on accounting for emissions reductions so that they would be positioned to take advantage of market opportunities down the road. A few cities have used the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism to finance emissions reduction activities. For example, Sao Paulo has a CDM registered landfill gas capture project that was financed by public and private partners, with the proceeds being split evenly between them and the public share being reinvested in social and environmental projects across the city (Puppim de Oliveira 2009 , Setzer 2009 ). However, few CDM projects are of this nature and there are limited opportunities for projects in high priority areas such as building energy efficiency or transport while accessing the CDM requires existing capacity in accounting for emissions (World Bank 2010b). Few cities have directly implemented the principles of carbon markets within their own jurisdictions. For example, the City of Tokyo is the first city to implement an emissions trading scheme at the urban scale. While cities are not necessarily major players in global carbon markets, the presence of carbon markets does seem to be reshaping the ways in which cities think about climate action. The growing influence of carbon markets and carbon finance on urban climate governance lends further weight to our original argument that it is not possible to consider such processes as operating purely within a local sphere. Any such 'localist' framework would obscure not only direct lines of investment and influence, but the broader political economies of which urban responses are a part. At the same time, the emergence of carbon markets as one field within and through which municipal urban responses are being governed is one factor that raises additional questions as to whether 'multilevel governance' perspectives can sufficiently capture the processes at work, and it is to these reflections that we now turn.
Multilevel explanations?
H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 8 As outlined in brief above, our original analysis of the urban politics of climate change engaged the conceptual vocabulary of multilevel governance in order to understand the ways in which resources, competencies and power were distributed both 'vertically' between levels of government and 'horizontally' through other spheres of authority and the consequent effects on urban climate governance. While scholars working in the field of cities and climate change had previously identified these issues as critical in shaping local capacity to respond to the issue (Lambwright et al. 1996 , Collier 1997 , DeAngelo and Harvey 1998 , engaging the concept of multilevel governance provided a coherent framework within which to analyse these issues and to point to the critical ways in which climate change is constituted as a political problem through this web of socio-spatial relations. Analysts have since deployed these concepts to good effect to assess the ways in which urban climate governance is shaped and contested. One important direction that this analysis has taken is to analyse the ways in which 'network' forms of governance are accomplished in the absence of formal processes of enforcement and of sanction. Here, analysis has focused on the opportunities that networks provide -for accessing resources, sharing knowledge, exhibiting political leadership, for example -that are critical in providing the incentives for municipalities to join and in sustaining networks over time. In Sweden, Mexico and South Africa, research has demonstrated the importance of access to climate change knowledge and to financial resources that networks provide, but highlighted the importance of the national and local institutional contexts within which such networks are operating in shaping their ability to achieve change on the ground (Granberg and Elander 2007 , Holgate 2007 , Romero Lankao 2007 .
At the same time, however, research has pointed to the very different logics that can underpin urban transnational climate networks, from forms of technical leadership in the case of the Cities for Climate Protection programme which Toly (2008, p. 350-351) suggests serves to promote 'neoliberal ecopolitical principles' to forms of 'norm entrepreneurship' in the case of the International Solar Cities programme within which more ambitious and radical goals are expressed. There are therefore important differences in the types of politics being promoted through networked forms of urban climate change governance, which are also unevenly experienced within networks. Kern and Bulkeley (2009, p. 316) find that 'in large networks like the Climate Alliance, the majority of the member cities are relatively passive.
Membership in this case may be only symbolic', creating an inner core of active cities that participate in the internal governance and strategic development of the network and a large periphery who may be only partially engaged by network discourses and practices. Writing in H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 9 reference to three such networks in Europe, they conclude that 'networks are networks of pioneers for pioneers', contributing to the uneven landscape of urban climate governance across the region (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, p. 329 However, despite the recognition of the importance of a degree of support for local action at higher levels of authority, evidence also shows that this is not a necessary condition for local action. In both the US and Australia, declarations of intent to address climate change grew most rapidly in the face of the reluctance of federal administrations to address the issue (Gore and Robinson 2009).
For many analysts, therefore, the multilevel governance framework has provided a useful means through which to assess formal divisions of responsibility and resources, as well as to understand how ideas and norms are mobilised to create particular conceptions of the climate governance problem and the relevant scope of urban responses. Reflecting on this body of work as well as our own contribution, however, there are two critical issues which warrant further exploration. First, despite the avowed concern with multilevel governance, analysis of urban climate change responses has placed municipal authorities at the heart of the analysis. Given, as discussed above, the growing role of carbon markets and non-state actors in the urban governance of climate change, this raises a significant challenge. At the same time, authors have begun to suggest that it is in the very process of governing climate change that forms of multilevel governance -in terms of new sphere of authority and new roles for different levels of government -are being forged. In Sweden, for example, Gustavsson et al. (2009, p. 70) find that 'climate networks and other networks are relatively self-governing, with collective actors challenging the territorially bounded, vertical, nature of central -local government relations', so that they can be regarded not only as a reflection of the 'rescaling of statehood' but fundamental to that process. For While et al. (2010) the process by which climate change comes to matter within urban and regional agendas is more fundamental, reflecting a current phase of eco-state restructuring within which 'carbon control' takes centre stage. Such analyses pose significant challenges for those broadly based H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 10 within a multilevel governance framework within which, rather curiously, relations between different parts of the state and other spheres of authority, are regarded in rather static terms.
Second, although the framework allows for an engagement with the multiple means through which climate change comes to be constructed or contested, in the main analysis has remained focused on the core policy areas within which climate change has come to be understood -for example, energy, transport, housing and waste. To date, there has been limited engagement with the ways in which, say, the activities of small and medium sized enterprises, the urban investment strategies of major companies and donors, or other processes that govern production and consumption, may serve to sustain, limit or contest urban climate responses. One example that has recently been highlighted is the limited extent to which studies of the multilevel governance of urban climate change responses has engaged with the dynamics of urban infrastructure systems (Monstadt 2009 ).
These 'socio-technical' systems are critical for they: structure a major part of the material metabolism in industrialized societies. They source, use, and transform huge amounts of natural resources. At the same time they are key catalysts of environmental problems like air, water, and soil pollution, and nuclear risks, and they make a major contribution to global warming' (Monstadt 2009, p. Despite its role in extending the horizons through which we can consider the urban politics of climate change, the overtly 'statist' focus of many multilevel governance analyses and their continued concern with the direct means through which climate change is governed may serve to limit its utility. While national and regional institutional and political contexts will continue to shape what it is and is not possible to address in climate change terms locally, the increasing complexity and fragmentation of climate governance suggests that H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 11 there is a growing need to engage more critically with where the authority and capability for addressing climate change as an urban problem lie. Further, while in our analysis we sought to demonstrate how the ability to govern climate change in both Newcastle and Cambridgeshire was constituted through the bringing together of discourses and resources from across these different political arenas, curiously for many analysts it appears that the framework provides a means through which the taken for granted divisions between the local, national and international on the one hand, and the public and private, on the other, can be maintained. As suggested above, new work in this field fundamentally challenges this assumption, suggesting that climate change is an arena within which what it means to be the state, and indeed the non-state, is being configured and contested (Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012) .
A new politics?
As intimated above, the development of urban responses beyond the narrow confines of the municipality and municipally led policy and planning processes to include a range of actors, sites and processes through which climate change is being addressed serves to extend the political arena within which urban climate change responses need to be considered. In our original analysis, the boundaries of what might constitute urban climate politics were rather neatly drawn around municipalities and the protagonists on either side of a discursive and material battle to define and confine the climate change agenda. As the previous sections have made clear, the landscape of urban climate change responses now far exceeds these battle lines. In this sense, then, we can determine that there is a 'new' politics of climate change emerging in the urban arena, one which is no more 'localist' than its predecessor, but which requires an analysis which goes beyond the framework offered by multilevel governance in order to capture its complexity and its implications. This is a politics, as we have argued above, that takes multiple forms.
On the one hand, the emergence of climate change as a strategic issue for a range of urban actors is leading, as we set out above, to what some have referred to as a politics of 'secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure' (Hodson and Marvin 2010) and others describe as an era of 'carbon control' (While et al. 2010) . Across a range of global cities, including for example London, New York, Los Angeles, Mexico City and Cape Town, new programmes for reducing greenhouse gas emissions have been accompanied by overt references to enhancing the security and independence of energy supply for cities and reducing the costs of energy for residents (Hodson and Marvin 2010, Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012) . There are H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 12 multiple actors engaged in this form of urban climate politics. While the specifics vary from city to city, they range from large corporations in the financial, energy and property sectors, to non-profit organisations seeking to promote forms of energy security as a means of alleviating poverty, non-governmental organisations campaigning on climate change as one of a number of environmental concerns, and municipal officers and politicians from different departments, including environment, energy, transport and green space. Melbourne is one such city where, despite the fragmented nature of local governance in the greater metropolitan area, a co-ordinated and strategic approach to climate change has emerged over the past decade. 2002 strategy that the target of reaching 'zero net' emissions will not be realized, the policy ambition to achieve significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions has been reiterated and appears to be spreading across the NAGA region. Seeking to explain the foundations of this success, participants suggest that it is the strategic significance of demonstrating leadership in this area that is the primary driver behind their achievements:
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We couldn't show how much money we have saved in total through all of these things. We probably can't show, I'm probably being unfair but we probably couldn't show how much it cost us either. We know as an organization that what we've gained reputation … and we know that we are making Melbourne … a better place to be a competitive 21 H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 14 Alternative understandings of how to secure and sustain urban communities are also emerging as cities seek to respond to climate change. Initiated in the UK and now to be found in cities in North America, Asia, and Australia, the Transition Towns movement is one such alternative (North 2009 , Smith 2010 . In common with the discourse of 'secure urbanism' regarded by Hodson and Marvin (2010) While the emergence of the discourses of 'secure urbanism' and 'carbon control' posit low carbon urbanism not only as compatible with but as essential to existing patterns of economic growth (Hodson and Marvin 2010, While et al. 2010) , these alternative forms of innovation challenge this dominant regime in two important ways. First, they seek to provide an alternative model of low carbon living, where forms of social and technical innovation are put to work to create new forms of economic and community relation. Second, they explicitly recognize that resource security is an essentially contested and unequal concept, with the result that vulnerability and resilience is highly differentiated within the city. Rather than witnessing the straightforward emergence of a homogenous and dominant regime for governing climate change in cities, the presence of these alternative forms of innovation points to a more fractured landscape, where strange bedfellows (e.g. international carbon finance and low income households in South Africa) are conjoined in developing new discourses of security and resilience, and where the potential for contestation and conflict is ever present. What this suggests is that urban climate politics is not automatically to be regarded as 'a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose parameters are defined by consensual socio-scientific knowledges' (Swyngedouw 2009, p. 602) . Instead, conflict, albeit sometimes latent and worked through everyday practices of resistance, contestation and the formation of the alternative, is emerging over what climate change should mean and for whom, and of the consequences for the future of cities. This is not to argue that such a politics is necessarily progressive, far from it, but it is to suggest that the extension of climate politics into new urban political arenas has disrupted the straightforward conflicts between economy and environmental protection that we found in our initial work in Newcastle and Cambridgeshire.
Conclusions
Revisiting our work on urban responses to climate change just a few years later, we are struck by how much has changed. As we articulate above, the emergence of a strategic urban response to climate change has entailed an engagement with a new set of urban places, politics and agendas that lay beyond the bounds of our analysis of 'municipal' responses.
Critically, we can determine the growing influence of a range of non-state actors in shaping urban climate governance and an ever more complex political economy of climate change, H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 16 woven between notions of carbon control, resource scarcity, resilience and security. At the same time, forms of 'municipal voluntarism' persist, as a growing number of municipalities take up the climate change cause. Climate change, it seems, is now firmly regarded as an issue with which cities can legitimately be concerned, albeit that the levels of engagement and interest in this agenda vary significantly.
Despite this sustained attention, and the apparent proliferation of interventions, projects and initiatives designed as part of this agenda, there remains uncertainty as to exactly what this activity might amount to. For some, the challenge remains one of accounting for the extent to which such policies and measures have made a material difference to levels of GHG emissions. Here, the rather unsatisfactory answer is that both at the level of individual cities and, perhaps more importantly, at an aggregate scale, we simply do not know. Municipal self-
reporting and individual projects have demonstrated significant emissions reductions and cobenefits, but there remain challenges in accurately assessing the impact of particular policy measures against an ever moving background and of integrating assessments that have used different indicators, baseline and measurement tools (Bulkeley and Newell 2010) . For others, the question is also one of the effect that the presence of climate change on urban agendas may have had in both more indirect and fundamental ways, in terms of shaping policy directions, determining courses of action that have and have not been taken, or effecting daily and mundane decisions concerning, for example, building management practices or the ways in which the road network is managed (Hoffmann 2011 ). As we found in our earlier work, understanding these dynamics requires both detailed fieldwork and an engagement with the political economies through which climate change is being conducted.
Recognising the parallel development of municipal voluntarism and strategic urbanism, the uneven manner in which mitigation and adaptation agendas are unfolding in a diverse set of urban contexts, and the limitations of our current understanding of the effects and effectiveness of urban climate governance requires we suggest a renewed engagement with just what a multilevel governance of climate change entails. It seems clear to us that any understanding of the multilevel governance of such processes must therefore loosen further its ties to static and scale-based assumptions of how governance is achieved, and instead consider the processes through which the political spaces of urban climate politics come to be configured and contested. For some, this may require a more critical interrogation of the discursive and institutional terrains through which climate change comes to be an issue on urban agendas. For others, this may entail stepping outside the boundaries of such institutional accounts of politics to consider the ways in which climate politics are made and H. Bulkeley and M.M. Betsill Environmental Politics 17 maintained through the socio-technical networks that sustain urban life. Whichever paths are chosen, moving forward in this field requires, we suggest, attention to three core agendas.
First, with the growing rhetoric and realisation of the 'low carbon economy', any understanding of urban climate governance must engage more closely with literatures on urban economies and their reconfiguration in the wake of the current period of economic restructuring. Second, as climate change becomes an ever more significant part of urban agendas there is a need to consider in detail the political economies and political ecologies of such processes, and in particular their implications for issues of social and environmental justice. Finally, we suggest that as more attention is devoted to the need for climate 'smart'
and 'resilient' cities, we need to ask critical questions about the political work that such discourses and practices of governing the city are seeking to achieve. Collectively, these agendas suggest that we need a more thoroughly political analysis of the urban climate governance problematic, a challenge to which we are sure the Environmental Politics community can rise.
